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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GLENN C. SHAW, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs . 
ASHLEY L. ROBISON, 
Defendant-Appellant, No. 13823 
KOVO, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant, 
vs. 
FIRST MEDIA CORPORATION, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal from the District Court of Utah County, 
the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge* 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In view of the license taken by respondent in its 
brief with respect to the facts, it is fortunate that 
respondent does not dispute that this is an equity 
proceeding.. The court thus has an opportunity to re-
view both the law and the facts to avoid any misimpres-
sions. Reiman v. Baum, 115 Utah 147, 203 P.2d 387 
(1949). 
Respondent's- brief is replete with inaccuracies, 
omissions, mis-statements, and exaggerations which re-
sult in the respondent falling far short of its stated 
objective to "set forth a complete statement of facts." 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 2) 
For example, appellants have never disputed the 
fact that the trial court appointed a receiver in Septem-
ber, 1973, for the stated purpose of selling and liqui-
dating the assets of the corporation as is indicated on 
page 6 of Respondent's Brief. Such order, however, was 
in addition to the court's specific directive to the 
appellants, at the same time the receiver was appointed, 
that if the appellants could resolve the corporate dead-
lock the court would immediately dissolve the receiver-
ship. (T. September 6, 1973, p. 76) Also,the court 
at the same time directed that the owners remained free 
to sell the KOVO stock to one another or to third parties. 
(T. September 6, 1973, p. 75) By conveniently over-
looking these facts the respondent has sought to 
create the impression that the owners were not author-
ized to continue to attempt to resolve their differ-
ences after a receiver was appointed — a fact which 
is simply not true as the record demonstrates and is 
also demonstrated by the owners1 continued negotia-
tions and good faith which ultimately resulted in a 
settlement of all differences. 
First Media Corporation's counsel makes repeated 
reference to the fact that neither of the owners appealed 
various intermediate orders and attempts to ascribe to 
this fact some sort of significance. (e.g. Respon-
dent's Brief, pp. 6, 14, 18) Since counsel has not 
objected to this court considering the matters em-
braced in the various orders, it can only be assumed 
that the issues posed by such orders are properly be-
fore the court but that the respondent is more comfort-
able destroying straw men than confronting the merits 
of the appeal. 
First Media Corporation's initial offer is charac-
terized by its counsel as a "detailed four-page, single 
space offer (containing) essential contract terms." 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 8) An examination of this 
document (FMC Exhibit 1, June 28, 1974) will reveal, 
that not all of the "four-detailed pages" directly 
concern the terms of the offer nor does it contain 
all essential contract terms as the differences be-
tween this letter and the later contract demonstrate. 
The captioned material on page 8 of Respondent's 
Brief indicates that First Media Corporation submitted 
the "highest and best offer" within the time deadline 
set by the receiver. Once again, by failing to acknowl-
edge the other offers considered by the court and sub-
mitted after this time, respondent purposefully ig-
nores the fact that the respondent's offer was actually 
not the highest or best offer, but that the offer sub-
mitted by appellant Shaw had "an inherent advantage" 
(R. 170), and that the receiver ultimately favored 
respondent's proposal for "Solomon like" reasons. 
(R. 170-172) 
Respondent takes considerable effort to point out 
in its "complete statement of facts" the effort and ex-
pense it went through after the February hearing, and 
substantiates its position in part with exhibits which 
were accepted by the court over the objections of 
appellant's counsel for a limited purpose totally 
unrelated to the proposition for which the respondent 
now attempts to utilize them. (T. June 28, 1974, 
P.43} 
Contrary to the respondent's representations, the 
question of reliance is not actually relevant to this 
appeal. If a contract were actually created at the 
time respondent alleges, the lower court's action can 
be upheld without considering this issue. But if a 
contract was not consummated, as the appellants 
strongly urge, any change in respondent's position 
would make no difference since respondent is charged 
with notice of the receiver's limited authority. 
Utilization by the respondent of such an ill-conceived 
legal position illustrates the respondent's willingness 
to assume any possibly conceivable position in order to 
prevail. 
In the note at page 44 of respondent's brief, 
First Media Corporation's counsel contends that the -
onerous $75,000 indemnification escrow is "neither 
unreasonable or inconsistent with paragraph 2 of the 
.5.. 
(purportedly) accepted offer. The amount involved is 
precisely the same, and the mechanical process of 
payment is the '. . . flesh on the bones1." (Emphasis 
added*) 
Once again the license respondent has taken with 
the facts is demonstrated by comparison to paragraph 2 
of First Media's letter offer (FMC Exhibit #1, June 28, 
1974) which states: 
Upon acceptance of this offer, FMC 
and/or Richard E. Marriott and/or other 
principal stockholders of FMC shall cause to 
be deposited in an escrow account to be 
mutually agreed upon the principal sum of 
Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000). The 
application of this Escrow Deposit toward 
payment of the net purchase price as 
described in paragraph 1 shall be governed 
by the terms and conditions of the Escrow 
Agreement. 
The agreement ultimately approved by the court 
(R. 189-218) provides in paragraph 4 for a $25,000 
escrow. (R. 19 5) It further provides in paragraph 
4(b)(2) (R. 196) for a $75,000 indemnification escrow, 
the onerous terms of which are found at R. 390. 
After a review of these provisions, it is diffi-
cult to determine how respondent's counsel can repre-
sent that "the amount involved is precisely the same" 
or that all that is involved is "flesh on the bones". 
(Respondent!s Brief, p. 44). This is a new, highly 
significant, and onerous term not found in respon-
dent's letter offer. Through a careful choice of 
words, that the indemnification escrow is not "in-
consistent" with paragraph 2 of the letter offer, 
respondent has created a serious misimpression. Such 
sophistry has no place before an appellate court. 
The misleading nature of First Media Corporation's 
factual recital is illustrated best of all by the rep-
resentations at page 13 of its brief that by order 
dated February 22, 1974, the court accepted its offer, 
in making this statement respondent apparently feels 
it has divined a fact not discernible by the receiver, 
by the receiver's counsel, by the owners of the radio 
station, or even by the court, as later proceedings 
indicate. In May, 1974, the receiver recognized 
that a binding contract had not been made, the receiver, 
in making motion for approval of a contract, requested 
"that the court enter its order approving the execution 
of the document by the receiver in a manner which is 
binding upon KOVO, Inc." (R. 186-187) 
.7. 
Receiver's counsel also testified in June that he 
understood a contract had not been consummated: 
[W]hat I intended to do as counsel 
for the receiver was to negotiate, com-
plete the negotiations of the contract 
along the lines of the FMC offer, and I 
understand procedurally it would be re-
submitted to the court for final approval. 
THE COURT: I suppose you thought 
you were carrying out the Order of Feb-
ruary 22? 
MR. ROBERTS: That is what I thought 
I was doing . . . procedurally I under-
stand there would have to be further ap-
proval by the court. 
(T. June 28, 1974, p. 137) 
The court itself, as indicated in the proferred 
Affidavit of Gary Stott, advised the parties on March 
15, 1974, that it had not approved any sale to First 
Media Corporation, but had only granted respondent 
the exclusive and limited right to negotiate with the 
receiver. (R. 311) 
R 
ARGUMENT 
'.'••...• POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE RE-
CEIVER'S MOTION TO AUTHORIZE EXECUTION OF 
SALES CONTRACT. 
A. In order for the proposed contract of sale to 
be in any respect binding or effective it required the 
further specific approval of the lower court. 
Throughout respondent's brief there is a basic fail-
ure to understand that the reason for the difficult 
position in which respondent finds itself is its ele-
mentary failure to recognize and acknowledge that ju-
dicial acceptance of a report and recommendation of a 
receiver is not tantamount to acceptance of an offer 
to purchase the underlying property. 
Respondent does not seriously dispute the analysis 
and explanation of judicial sales applicable to this 
proceeding as explained in appellants1 brief. (Res-
pondent's Brief, p. 21-22) Where a judicial sale is 
not regulated by statute, a court essentially makes its 
own law subject to the use of sound discretion. Chapman 
v. Schiller, 95 Utah 514, 83 P.2d 249, 251 (1938). A 
bidder at a judicial sale bids at his peril, and any bid 
.9. 
remains an offer to purchase until it is accepted 
and confirmed by the court. 47 Am. Jur.2d, Judicial 
Sales, § 136 p. 407. 
Respondent apparently further concedes that any 
bidder at a judicial sale bids with notice that the 
sale is subject to judicial confirmation, and that 
confirmation may be withheld to protect the rights of 
the property owner or those having an interest in it. 
47 Am. Jur. 2d Judicial Sales, § 136 p. 407. 
Respondent, apparently not being able to locate 
any authority contrary to that cited by appellants, 
suggests that the cases of Freebill v. Greenfield, 
204 F.2d 907 (2nd Cir. 1953) and Morris v. Burnett, 
154 F. 617 (8th Cir. 1907) (cited at pages 21-22 of 
Respondent's Brief) actually stand for the proposition 
that separate acts of acceptance and confirmation are 
only necessary when an offer is first accepted by an 
officer other than the court itself, such as by a 
receiver. Such a simplistic solution is not helpful. 
Obviously since a judicial sale involves a contract 
between the court and a separate entity, the court 
must confirm any arrangements made by an agent of the 
.10. 
court on its behalf. Equally obvious, the fact that 
an offer must only be confirmed once by the court 
does not mean that the receiver or other agent of 
the court is precluded from receiving authorization 
or instruction from the court as often as necessary 
during the course of the receivership. 
As indicated in Chapman v. Schiller, supra, where, 
as here, the procedure to be followed in a judicial 
sale is not regulated by statute, the court has wide 
discretion in formulating a procedure appropriate for the 
particular situation. Once, however, the court has 
determined to follow a particular procedure in making a 
judicial sale, the court is obliged to adhere to the 
self imposed rules. Here, the court devised an alter-
nate approach to resolution of the stockholder dispute. 
Contrary to respondent's assertion that such an alterna-
tive approach is "wholly unsupported by the record" and 
"would clearly constitute a fraud upon bona fide third-
party purchasers" (Respondent's Brief, p. 23) the record 
is very clear that this is the manner in which the court 
chose to proceed. 
j. 
As noted in 2 Clark on Receivers, § 519 at 835: 
It has been held that a bidder at 
a receiver's sale acquires no enforceable 
rights until his bid is accepted by the 
court. . . 
And because the court has wide latitude to establish 
rules for proceeding on a judicial sale which are 
appropriate to the particular situation the respon-
dent's contention that such a procedure would "con-
stitute a fraud upon bona fide third party purchasers" 
is absurd since respondent had notice of the court's 
procedure. Joseph Nelson Plumbing & Heating Supply 
Co. v. McCrea, 64 Utah 484, 231 P. 823 (1924). Despite 
respondent's attempt to obfuscate its meaning (compare 
p. 40 of Respondent's Brief with pp. 43-44 of Appel-
lants' Brief) this case stands for the proposition that 
the court retains this wide latitude at all times. As 
Joseph Nelson Plumbing indicates, the court has wide 
discretion to set aside a judicial sale. 
The court appointed a receiver in September, 1973, 
for the purpose of selling and liquidating the assets 
and business of the corporation. (R. 106, 108) At 
the same time, the court directed that the owners of 
the business should continue to attempt to reach a 
solution between themselves, and that if such a solu-
tion were reached the court would dissolve the receiv-
ership. (T. September 6, 1913, p. 76) Significantly, 
the court also explicitly directed that the owners 
should remain free to sell and transfer their stock 
in the business to whomever they pleased. (T. Septem-
ber 6, 1973, p. 75) The court did not subsequently 
limit in any manner the right of the owners to continue 
to seek a solution to the deadlock. Indeed, the ab-
sence of any indication to the contrary in the record 
following the specific authorization to continue to 
negotiate fully supports the owners1 position and under-
standing. 
Respondent's attempt to fabricate support for its 
position suggesting that the court assigned related fi-
nancial disputes between the owners to a separate judge 
is not, even by respondent's standards, competent evi-
dence to refute the specific references in the record 
that the court did in fact approve of a dual approach. 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 24, note.) 
Respondent spends much time in its brief attempting 
to demonstrate that, according to basic principles of 
contract law, it is not unusual for a basic agreement to 
be reached between separate parties and later to have 
this agreement translated into a more detailed document. 
Obviously, this occurs. Such a demonstration, however, 
adds very little to a resolution of whether or not a con-
tract in fact existed as respondent maintains. The facts 
as amply cited in this brief are otherwise. 
On January 31, 1974, the receiver sought an order 
of the court respecting the sale of the corporate assets 
and asked that a hearing be held to consider the offers 
received as of the date of the hearing. The receiver 
further sought, following the hearing, to have the court 
issue an order ". . . authorizing the receiver to nego-
tiate and execute an appropriate contract of sale of the 
corporate assets. (Emphasis added.)" (R. 51) Obviously, 
the receiver's intent in making a motion to the court 
prior to the February hearing, was not to have a con-
tract approved. At the February 6, 1974, hearing, the 
receiver's counsel represented that the purpose of 
the hearing'was ". . . (to have) the court determine 
which of these constitutes highest and best offer, 
and then request(ing) the court to authorize the 
receiver to proceed to negotiate a firm and binding 
contract of sale with the offeror who has presented 
the highest and best offer" (emphasis added). (T. 
February 6, 1974, p. 2) 
After considering the offers of the owners and 
First Media Corporation, the court entered its order 
on February 22, 1974. This order is in the record 
(R. 173) and has been frequently quoted in the par-
ties' briefs. As the order indicates, it was not the 
court's intention to form a contract with First Media 
Corporation, but merely to direct that the report and 
recommendation cf the receiver be accepted. That this 
is clear from the facts and the order itself is evi-
dent. Respondent's counsel implicitly acknowledges 
the clarity of this position when their position is 
ultimately reduced to the argument that this entire 
matter can only be understood and resolved as a re-
sult of determining what was meant by the placing of 
a comma after "FMC, Inc." Respondent's position at 
best is an indication that the order is somewhat 
unclear, and that the surrounding facts must be closely 
examined. An examination of the facts indicates a 
contract was not consummated. 
Because the March 15, 19 7 4 hearing was not 
reported it was necessary for the Court to consider any 
evidence offered by the parties as to what had 
transpired at the time the order was formulated. 
On June 28, 19 74 a hearing was held at v/hich time 
Mr. Martineau, counsel for Shaw, indicated the 
following concerning his recollection: 
" . . . And I would just point out one thing; 
At the hearing of the objection made by 
Mr. Stott on behalf of Robison to the Court's 
order of February 22nd, we had a hearing, and 
although it's indicated in the Court record 
it was reported, apparently it was not. But 
at that hearing the Court was very explicit 
in saying that this was merely an offer to 
negotiate and the basis for a negotiation and 
not an acceptance of an offer or sale as 
such. The contract was entered by the Court 
and approved by the Court. I am sure we all 
proceeded on that basis. 
"THE COURT: Your position simply I take 
it is analogous to a probate proceeding where 
the sale of the property is not final until 
it is approved by the Court, is that right? 
"MR. MARTINEAU: That is right." 
(T. June 28, 19 74, p.6. Emphasis added.) 
Similarly, on July 3, 1974 the affidavit of Gary 
Stott, counsel for Robison, was offered into evidence 
by Mr. Martineau as a further explanation of what had 
occurred during the March 15th meeting. Mr. Stott in 
his affidavit stated the following: 
"4. On or about March 6, 1974, your 
affiant had submitted to the Court on behalf 
of Robison, an Objection to the Court's order 
Approving any Sale of KOVO to FMC. That 
hearing which I believe was heard on March 15, 
1974, The Honorable Allen B. Sorensen advised 
your affiant and those present at that hearing 
that he had not approved any sale to FMC; that 
he was only approving the right of the 
Receiver to negotiate with FMC for the purpose 
of seeing if a sale of KOVO could be arrived 
at. Your affiant does not recall whether that 
hearing was reported, but does recall speci-
fically that my objection was heard by the 
Court and that pursuant to my objection the 
Court advised those present at that hearing 
that no sale was being approved at that time." 
(R. 310-311. Emphasis added.) 
The trial court, however, refused to accept this 
affidavit on the grounds that it was hearsay but did 
allow it to be proffered as proof. This rejection of 
the affidavit was made despite the acceptance into 
evidence of newspaper articles offered by Mr. Greene, 
counsel for FMC, which reported the various hearings 
which had occurred. (T. July 3, 1974, p. 3-5). 
The failure of the Court to allow the affidavit of 
Gary Stott into evidence was clearly error since 
appellants were entitled to submit affidavits in 
proceedings involving a determination of a Motion. The 
July 3, 1974 hearing together with the preceding 
hearings were held pursuant to the Receiver's Motion to 
authorize execution of the sale contract. (R. 186-188). 
This is made abundantly clear by the Court's order 
referring to the Motion and reciting the various 
hearings which were held between May and July of 1974. 
CR. 400-410). 
Thusf the proceedings at which the affidavit was 
introduced was not that of a trial in which the Court 
was a trier of facts but was proceedings to determine 
the outcome of a Motion. Rule 43(e) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure unquestionably allows the intro-
duction of affidavits into evidence. This rule states: 
"When a Motion is based on facts not appearing 
of record the Court may hear the matter on 
affidavits presented by the respective 
parties, but the Court may direct that the 
matter be heard wholly or partly on oral 
testimony or depositions." 
As has been stated: 
"In general practice, affidavits may be used 
to start in motion the process of the court 
and are generally received as evidence upon 
the hearing of Motions, irrespective of the 
vital influence the latter may have upon the 
final outcome of the suit." 3 Am. Jur. 2d, 
§ 29, p.404. 
Likewise: 
"Where a Motion is based on facts not 
appearing of record, the Court may, gener-
ally, in its discretion, either hear the 
matter on affidavits presented by the 
respective parties or direct the matter be 
heard wholly or partially on oral testimony 
or depositions. Generally, the admission of 
oral testimony or depositions in addition to 
affidavits is within the discretion of the 
Court." 56 Am. Jur. 2d, § 26, p.21. 
Therefore, the rule definitely allows the use of 
affidavits into evidence for the purpose of estab-
lishing facts at a Motion unless the Court, in its 
discretion, orders oral testimony or depositions to be 
used in their place. If this occurs, however, the 
Court should allow the parties sufficient time to 
obtain the witnesses or depositions if the affidavits 
are refused since a party, as a normal course, presumes 
that the affidavits are admissible in support of his 
Motion, Cf. 5 Moore's on Federal Practice, fl 43.13, 
p.1385-1387. 
The use; of affidavits in a proceeding confirming a 
sale is clearly proper as demonstrated in the case of 
Sheel v. Rinard, 430 P.2d 482 (Idaho 1967). 
In that case respondents moved for an order 
approving the sale of a ranch which had been the 
subject of an injunction by the District Court* 
Respondents relied upon the files and records of the 
action and upon representations of fact recited in 
respondents1 Motions. The appellants opposed the 
Motion by an affidavit in which they alleged that the 
sale was at a price lower than the agreed sale between 
the respondents and the appellants. The affidavits 
were admitted into evidence by the District Court. In 
discussing the use of affidavits in such a hearing the 
Supreme Court of Idaho stated the following: 
l![T]he District Court at the hearing on 
respondents' Motion was not confined to any 
particular method of receiving evidence. The 
Court may require all evidence in support of 
the Motion to be presented by affidavit, but 
in its discretion the Court may also permit 
other written or oral proof." Id. at 45. 
Likewise in Beckett v. Kaynar Manufacturing Co., 
321 P.2d 749 (Cal. 1958), the Supreme Court of 
California approved the use of affidavits during a 
Motion for court confirmation of an arbitration award. 
The Court specifically held that findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were not necessary in the determin-
ation of a Motion. Similarly, the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law entered by the trial court in this 
case (R. 403-410) were unnecessary in that they did not 
relate to an action "tried upon the facts without a 
jury." (Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). 
Likewise, the Court's ruling that the affidavit could 
be admitted as a proffer of proof was also erroneous 
since the proceeding in which the affidavit was offered 
was not "an action tried without a jury" and the 
evidentiary requirements of hearsay are not present. 
(Rule 43(c), U.R.C.P.). 
Obviously, any affidavit is necessarily hearsay 
but the Rules specifically allow the admission of 
affidavits to establish facts at hearings on Motions. 
Were this not the case the courts would be overrun with 
evidentiary hearings where witnesses would have to be 
present to testify to procedural matters. Of course, 
as noted previously, the Court can require more than 
affidavits presuming that counsel are given notice that 
affidavits will not be accepted. This was clearly not 
done by the Court in any other proceedings and it was 
therefore error to exclude the affidavits without such 
notification that the actual witness himself would have 
to be present• 
The effect of this exclusion was that there is 
little evidence"introduced into the record on behalf of 
appellants to support their position that the March 15, 
1974 hearing did not result in a sale of KOVO assets 
but merely resulted in the approval of the Court for 
the Receiver to negotiate the sale. 
Since this appeal is primarily concerned with whether 
a binding contract was or was not consummated, the under-
standing of what transpired at this hearing and the exclusion 
of this evidence was patently prejudicial to the appellants. 
This Court must reverse the lower court's determination 
so that the affidavit may be examined for its probative 
value in establishing what transpired at this crucial 
hearing. A review of this competent evidence will 
demonstrate there was no contract. 
B. Intervenor had notice of the Receiver's 
limited authority and acquired no vested rights. 
Respondent suggests that it acquired vested 
rights by analogy to "fundamental principles of con-
tract law". (Respondent's Brief, p. 24) Through-
out its entire argument on this point respondent 
again ignores the basic point, that "fundamental 
principles of contract law" are modified and must * 
yield to the procedure necessary to foster orderly 
judicial sales. 
Respondent does not deny that all persons deal-
ing with a receiver are chargeable with knowledge of 
the limitations on the receiver's authority to act 
or contract. 2 Clark on Receivers, § 433, p. 277. 
Respondent further does not deny that it had notice 
of the limitations on the receiver's authority. 
Knowing of the limitations on the receiver's 
authority, and being present at the hearings held 
on the receiver's report, respondent cannot seriously 
urge that they misunderstood, were misled, or acquired 
any vested rights. 
If, as respondent alleges, it acquired vested 
.23 . 
rights, when were the owners1 rights divested? The 
primary purpose of the receivership was to protect 
the rights of the shareholders and the corporation, 
yet the respondent would have us believe that, with-
out notice, the owners rights were divested and be-
stowed upon an unrelated third party. Such a position 
is neither reasonable nor in accordance with well un-
derstood equitable principles applicable to this case. 
POINT II. 
THE CONTRACT OF SALE PROPOSED BY THE IN-
TERVENOR WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM 
ITS BID AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPROVED 
BY THE LOWER COURT. 
As indicated in Appellants1 initial Brief, a 
comparison of the initial letter offer of FMC (R. 141-
144) and the lengthy contract submitted to the court 
for approval (R. 189-259), reveals not only numerous, 
but substantial changes. Respondent is correct in 
suggesting that a difference in the length of the 
documents does not necessarily reveal inconsistency. 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 43) However, as has earlier 
been pointed out in this reply brief, there are many 
onerous and unfair differences in favor of the inter-
vener in the longer document. This is amply demonstrated 
,24. 
by the inclusion of a $75,000 indemnity escrow, which 
respondent's counsel suggests is "not inconsistent" 
and mere "flesh on the bones". It can only be remarked 
that with a few "fleshing provisions" such as this 
the remainder would not even be fit carrion. 
Implicitly recognizing the numerous and substan-
tial differences, respondent attempts to somehow 
place responsibility on the owners for the unfair 
changes. (Respondent's Brief, p. 45) Such suggestion 
cannot be taken seriously. As indicated in Appellants1 
initial Brief at page 45, the owners were not supplied 
with certain pertinent documents until they specifically 
requested them, and so had little to do with the negotiations. 
There is no dispute that there were many unfair 
changes made. As indicated in respondent's brief, 
respondent was hard-pressed to explain many of the dis-
crepancies pointed out by appellants, and ultimately attempted 
to ignore many of them when efforts to account for certain 
major changes failed. (See Respondent's Brief, Note, p. 
44, for an example of this.) 
It is self-evident that even if in fact a binding 
contract had been made on February 22, 1974, 
the contract approved by the court should be disap-
proved and Rejected because of the many substantial 
and unfair changes which were made. 
CONCLUSION 
In conducting a judicial sale, the court has 
wide latitude in establishing the judicial procedure 
to be employed. Such flexibility is necessary to 
account for the many exigent circumstances which may 
be present. Here the court permitted an alternative 
approach to settlement because it was not an insolvency 
proceeding. Accordingly, when the owners resolved 
these differences before a binding contract was made 
and confirmed, the receivership should have been ter-
minated. Intervenor First Media Corporation had 
knowledge of the limitations on the receiver's authority 
and proceeded with a clear understanding that the re-
ceivership would be terminated if the owners resolved 
these differences. 
The motion of the receiver for approval of the 
agreement, as to which the receiver and its counsel took 
no position, should have been denied and the motion of 
the parties for dismissal of the receivership action, 
subject of course to proper safeguards and conditions, 
should have been granted. 
In the alternative this court should at the very 
minimum remand this case to the lower court with in-
structions that it scrutinize with care all provisions 
of any contract which it may hereafter approve to insure 
not only fair consistency with the initial FMC offer but 
adequate protection for the rights and interests of the 
owners and KOVO as well. 
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